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139 
WHY AND HOW TO COMPENSATE EXONEREES 
Erik Encarnacion* 
 
Brothers Henry McCollum and Leon Brown were tried and convicted 
for the rape and murder of an 11-year-old girl. McCollum faced the death 
penalty, Brown life incarceration. Roughly thirty years later they were 
exonerated by DNA evidence and freed from prison.1 
North Carolina awarded each brother $750,000.2 A statute guaranteed 
the payments upon receipt of a full pardon from the state’s governor. This 
kind of statute, which allows exonerees to obtain compensation without 
filing lawsuits or otherwise establishing that official misconduct caused the 
incarceration, is called a compensation statute.3 North Carolina’s statute 
awards exonerees $50,000 per year but caps the total amount of 
compensation at $750,000.4 In this case, the cap effectively reduced each 
brother’s award to $25,000 for each year of incarceration. 
Many agree that exonerees ought to be compensated somehow. It is also 
increasingly well accepted that the best mechanism for ensuring 
compensation, if compensation is to be awarded at all, is through 
compensation statutes. Compensation statutes represent the gold standard for 
compensating exonerees because these statutes do not require exonerees to 
 
 * Ph.D. Candidate, University of Southern California. The author would like to thank 
Caroline Feda, Ellie Forche, Tyler Matheson, Laila Naraghi, and Kemi Ogun, for their 
 1. North Carolina Brothers to Receive $750,000 Each for Wrongful Convictions, 
GUARDIAN (Sept. 2, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/sep/02/north-carolina-
brothers-wrongful-convictions [https://perma.cc/UF9T-3TBX]. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Adele Bernhard, A Short Overview of the Statutory Remedies for the Wrongly 
Convicted: What Works, What Doesn’t and Why, 18 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 403, 409 (2009) 
(“Compensation statutes provide money and services to exonerated individuals without regard 
to fault or blame. Generally, claimants need only establish innocence and prove that they 
served time in prison as a result of the wrongful conviction.”); Alberto B. Lopez, $10 and a 
Denim Jacket? A Model Statute for Compensating the Wrongly Convicted, 36 GA. L. REV. 
665, 704 (2002) (“[A] compensatory statute allows an unjustly convicted individual to seek 
redress for her injuries without having to show malice, negligence, or some other transgression 
by the state actors involved in the case.”). 
 4. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-84(a) (2015). 
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establish official wrongdoing or to file lawsuits, and they furnish faster 
compensation than the process of litigation allows.5 
But jurisdictions still disagree about whether to adopt these statutes and 
how much compensation they should award. For example, North Carolina’s 
compensation looks paltry compared to the $80,000 per year offered by 
Texas6 and even the $50,000 guaranteed by Alabama,7 neither of which 
(unlike North Carolina) caps total compensation. Still, McCollum and 
Brown are comparatively lucky. Louisiana has an even lower compensation 
cap than North Carolina.8 Other states, like Kentucky and Pennsylvania, lack 
compensation statutes altogether. In such states, it is in principle possible to 
recover compensation, provided that the victim sues the state and shows 
improper conduct by law enforcement officials. But these cases are very 
difficult to win.9 And some innocents end up in prison even if each official 
in the criminal process acted in good faith in prosecuting them.10 These 
cases offer virtually no hope for exoneree compensation in states lacking 
compensation statutes. 
I 
How can we bring greater uniformity to exoneree compensation in a 
principled and just way? This paper argues that answering this question 
becomes easier once we identify the principles of justice that best justify and 
explain compensation statutes. In particular, commentators have assumed 
incorrectly that the goal of compensating exonerees should be understood 
primarily in terms of corrective justice, which posits a duty to undo or repair 
 
 5. See sources cited supra note 3; see also Evan J. Mandery et al., Compensation 
Statutes and Post-Exoneration Offending, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 553, 559 (2013) 
(“The best bet for an exoneree seeking compensation is through a preexisting statute, though 
the picture here is also grim. Only twenty-seven states and the District of Columbia have 
enacted statutes to compensate the wrongfully convicted.”). Exonerees are typically 
unsuccessful in bringing civil claims due to the “inflexibility” of tort and civil rights law. 
Bernhard, supra note 3, at 404. 
 6. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 103.052(a) (West 2015). 
 7. ALA. CODE § 29-2-159(a) (LexisNexis 2015). 
 8. See LA. STAT. ANN. § 15:572.8(H)(2) (West 2016) (allocating $25,000 per year of 
incarceration for a maximum of $250,000). 
 9. See, e.g., Michael Avery, Obstacles to Litigating Civil Claims for Wrongful 
Conviction: An Overview, 18 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 439 (2009). 
 10. It happens. See, e.g., Lara Bazelon, Justice After Injustice, SLATE (Sept. 30, 2015), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2015/09/restorative_justice_for
_false_convictions_crime_victims_and_exonerated_convicts.single.html 
[https://perma.cc/J2RE-EY9U] (describing good faith but mistaken accusations against 
exoneree Thomas Haynesworth). 
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wrongfully inflicted harms. This paper argues, by contrast, that restitutionary 
justice, which forces parties to relinquish unjust gains, better justifies and 
explains compensation statutes. The unjust gains at issue are fair wages 
withheld from those performing crime-deterrence services. That is, this 
paper claims that prisoners, like law enforcement officials, perform crime-
deterrence services simply by virtue of their incarceration. The state might 
fairly withhold compensation from the guilty for their crime-deterrence role, 
on the grounds that we should avoid rewarding individuals for their 
wrongdoings. But this rationale for withholding payment does not apply to 
innocent prisoners; innocent prisoners are in effect pressed into service as 
instruments of criminal deterrence without being compensated for this task. 
Fair compensation cannot be justly withheld from the innocent, any more 
than the state may justly withhold compensation from conscripts unwillingly 
pressed into military service. 
Perhaps the most important advantage of the restitutionary justification 
lies in its ability to give principled and relatively determinate guidance for 
legislators seeking to set a fair rate of compensation. If we understand 
round-the-clock incarceration as just one mode of crime deterrence in 
pursuit of public security interests, we can look around for analogous jobs 
and their level of compensation in order to find ballpark ranges within which 
compensation looks reasonably fair. We also learn from the restitutionary 
approach that caps on payments—like the ones restricting payouts to 
McCollum and Brown in North Carolina—are seriously unjust. In sum, this 
restitutionary perspective points toward a principled and just range of fair 
payment capable of bringing order to the disarray among payment regimes 
in various jurisdictions. 
This restitutionary approach provides not only a new justification for 
compensation statutes and useful guidance for legislators, but it also 
provides a better justification for these statutes than corrective justice. 
Consider two problems with a corrective justice explanation that a 
restitutionary justification avoids. One is that corrective justice implies, 
arguably, that exonerees must establish that official wrongdoing—that is, 
negligent, reckless, knowing, or purposeful wrongdoing—caused the 
incarceration. If establishing this kind of wrongdoing is necessary, as some 
conceptions of corrective justice require, then compensation statutes are 
unjustified given that they characteristically do not require establishing 
official wrongdoing. A second problem lies in the inherently individualized 
nature of corrective justice, which traditionally allocates damages on a case-
by-case basis. This implies that, when we seek to repair a person’s life, we 
must take into account the trajectory of that person’s life before 
incarceration and try to afford compensation in a way that attempts, as far as 
possible, to reconstruct that life. Apart from the fact that this reparative ideal 
is very difficult to implement practically (especially in cases of long-term 
incarceration), individually assessing compensation is wholly at odds with 
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compensation statutes, which provide periodic lump sum—indeed, wage-
like—compensation to exonerees without regard to their individual needs. 
Corrective justice therefore does not fit the structure of compensation 
provided by compensation statutes—or at least not as well as a fair-wage-
based restitutionary account would. 
II 
Let us begin indirectly by raising a threshold objection to the very idea 
of automatic compensation for all exonerees. Specifically, the objection 
holds that—pursuant to corrective justice—exonerees are not entitled to 
compensation unless the state engaged in wrongdoing in securing their 
conviction. This entails, the argument goes, that states prosecuting 
individuals in good faith and without misconduct owe no compensation if 
those individuals are later exonerated. I will argue that the argument is 
ultimately unsuccessful. But the objection nevertheless raises enough of a 
worry to motivate a turn away from the reparative perspective presupposed 
by corrective justice and toward a restitutionary approach. 
The argument goes like this: An exoneree’s demand for compensation is 
a demand for reparative relief on account of having been wronged. 
Essentially, it is a demand for relief predicated on a principle of corrective 
justice. This principle holds, roughly, that one is entitled to reparative 
compensation by the wrongdoer only if one has suffered injuries as a result 
of the wrongdoing.11 Hence, if there has been no official wrongdoing, 
officials are not required to pay compensation. 
This argument initially appears to bolster the claim that exonerees must 
establish official misconduct. After all, if all officials who play some causal 
role in securing the innocent person’s incarceration acted in good faith, the 
incarceration was an “innocent” mistake. And if it was innocent, then no 
wrongdoing occurred. Hence, corrective justice requires no compensation. 
So a prerequisite for compensation is a showing of wrongdoing by an 
official that caused the mistaken incarceration. Call this the corrective 
justice argument. 
I suspect that something like this argument explains in part why some 
jurisdictions hesitate to enact compensation statutes, which characteristically 
offer relief without requiring that the exoneree establish official misconduct. 
 
 11. This formulation reflects the traditional conception of corrective justice. See 
generally JULES COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE 1–64 (2001) (defending a traditional 
conception of corrective justice as the best explanation for tort law’s structure). But see Erik 
Encarnacion, Corrective Justice as Making Amends, 62 BUFF. L. REV. 451, 490–509 (2014) 
(articulating another, nontraditional conception of corrective justice grounded in moral norms 
of making amends). 
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Something like the corrective justice argument might also explain why some 
jurisdictions offer only a pittance by way of compensation: They are not 
motivated by the goal of repairing the often-considerable physical, social, 
and psychological injuries suffered on account of wrongful incarceration. 
Rather, the pittance might be motivated by a milquetoast sense of pity or a 
duty of beneficence, at best. Compensation statutes with low payouts are, 
from the perspective of the corrective justice argument just considered, 
supererogatory. 
The problem with the corrective justice argument just considered, 
however, is that it assumes an overly narrow conception of wrongdoing. It 
assumes, that is, that one must act negligently, recklessly, or maliciously—
or otherwise with fault. But this need not be the case. Tort law, at least, 
recognizes a range of transgressions that count as wrongs despite involving 
no fault (i.e., strict liability wrongs).12 One can wrong another person simply 
by transgressing certain boundaries, especially with respect to artificial 
boundaries established by property law and natural boundaries established 
by one’s own body. If I trespass on your land, I potentially owe 
compensation for any injury on that land even if I reasonably believed that 
the land was mine.13 And I might commit a battery against you simply by 
intentionally touching you without your consent, even if in good faith 
(though mistakenly) I thought you were my good friend.14 Again, this is so 
even if I behaved perfectly innocently but mistakenly. The wrongdoing is a 
form of strict liability wrong, where the wrong consists in the doing of the 
transgression itself voluntarily though without fault. 
There is another form of strict liability wrong that becomes plain in 
cases of necessity. These are cases in which someone acts justifiably in 
appropriating another person’s property yet nevertheless wrongs them by not 
voluntarily compensating them. Initially, this class of cases seems 
incoherent, since one may not justifiably wrong another. But that is not the 
claim. One can act justifiably under the circumstances yet still wrong 
someone by not voluntarily offering up compensation. This is especially so 
in cases involving the use of another’s person or property. In this vein, 
Gregory Keating has an illuminating analysis of certain strict liability torts 
that may involve justified conduct but that nevertheless give rise to valid 
 
 12. For a sophisticated attempt to reconcile strict liability with corrective justice, see 
Kenneth W. Simons, Jules Coleman and Corrective Justice in Tort Law: A Critique and 
Reformation, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 849, 867–881 (1992). 
 13. See, e.g., S. Ctys. Ice Co. v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 39 F. Supp. 157 (S.D. Cal. 
1941). 
 14. See White v. Univ. of Idaho, 797 P.2d 108, 109 (Idaho 1990) (“ ‘A battery . . . 
requires intentional bodily conduct which is either harmful or offensive,’ that does not mean 
that the person has to intend that the contact be harmful or offensive.”) (quoting Doe v. 
Durtschi, 716 P.2d 1238, 1243 (Idaho 1986)). 
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claims for compensation.15 Consider Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation 
Co.16 In that case, a ship was caught in a terrible storm, and rather than risk 
life and limb (and ship), the captain commandeered a dock, presumably 
saving everyone and everything in the process—except, that is, the dock, 
which suffered damage. The dock owners filed suit, arguing that the captain 
trespassed and that they were entitled to compensation. The ship owners 
argued that they were justified in commandeering the dock given the 
extreme circumstances and hence did nothing wrong. And if they did 
nothing wrong, they acted with due care, and thus did not have to pay 
compensation to repair the ship.17 
The ship owners lost the argument.18 But it is puzzling why, if there was 
no wrongdoing at issue. Keating’s reinterpretation of the case is compelling: 
there was a wrongdoing—namely, the fact that the ship owner failed to 
voluntarily pay for the damaged dock.19 This view recognizes that there are 
limits to property owners’ rights to exclude others from their premises, 
which may be permissibly infringed in cases of necessity. We may 
permissibly use others’ property without consent in such cases. That said, 
due respect for people and their property still requires voluntarily 
compensating for damage done even if that damage was all justified under 
the circumstances. The wrong is, in other words, the wrong of 
nonconsensual-using-without-compensating—not merely nonconsensual 
using. 
Each of these kinds of “strict-liability wrongs,” using Keating’s 
terminology, provides a way of resisting the idea that corrective justice 
requires exonerees to establish official misconduct. The wrongful injury to 
the exoneree is akin to the wrongful injury in a battery—an unconsented-to 
transgression of his bodily autonomy for which he must be compensated 
even if the transgression occurred in good faith. Alternatively, or 
additionally, the wrongful injury was the state’s failure to voluntarily 
compensate him for using his body as an instrument of crime deterrence. 
That is, by imprisoning him, they used his body—just as Lake Erie 
Company used Vincent’s docks—in a way that may have been justifiable 
 
 15. Gregory C. Keating, Strict Liability Wrongs, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
THE LAW OF TORTS 292 (John Oberdiek ed., 2014). 
 16. Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 124 N.W. 221 (Minn. 1910). 
 17. Id. at 221. 
 18. Id. at 222. 
 19. Keating, supra note 15, at 302 (“The wrong in Vincent lay not in the defendant’s 
doing damage to the dock, but in the defendant’s wrongful (or unreasonable) failure to step 
forward and volunteer in the aftermath of the storm to make good the damage done the 
dock.”). 
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under the circumstances. Still, compensation is owed to repair the damage 
done to his life. 
The upshot is this: Despite the superficial appeal of the corrective justice 
argument against no-fault compensation, corrective justice does not 
necessarily require a showing that negligence or other kind of official 
misconduct caused an exoneree’s incarceration. The mere fact that he was 
innocently imprisoned suffices to show that reparative compensation is 
owed, assuming that two forms of strict liability wrongs count as genuine 
wrongs. And if this analysis goes through, the amount of compensation 
should be fixed by reference to the amount that each exoneree lost as a result 
of the incarceration. 
III 
The preceding section argued that strict liability justifications for 
exoneree compensation are consistent with a corrective-justice-based, 
reparative approach. But we should also worry about these justifications. 
First, even granting that tort law recognizes strict liability wrongs as genuine 
legal wrongs, it is not obvious that they are genuine moral wrongs according 
to principles of justice. Some corrective justice theorists try to explain away 
strict liability wrongs as cases of negligence in disguise or as simply 
incompatible with corrective justice.20 These writers argue that tort law, to 
the extent that it really does impose faultless liability, is itself prima facie 
defective. The strict liability justification therefore looks like quite a 
controversial foundation on which to place demands for exoneree 
compensation. 
There is another worry. This one relates to the mode of recovery 
prescribed for corrective justice: reparative compensation. How do we 
measure this compensation? Again, corrective justice holds that we should 
try to make things as if the incarceration had never had occurred, just as the 
appellant in Vincent had to pay reparative relief to the dock owners to repair 
the dock. 
Of course this goal is often near impossible, especially for innocents 
who have been incarcerated for long terms. It is not obvious what paths 
people would have taken—which careers they would have taken up, for 
example—had they not been imprisoned. And suppose we could figure out 
what has been lost. Many—most, I hazard—of those innocents who wind up 
in prison are not well off enough to afford good lawyers. So even if we 
could identify their projected lost earnings, chances are they would not be 
very high. But it seems perverse, to me at least, to suggest that those who are 
 
 20. E.g., ERNEST WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 171 (rev. ed. 2012) (arguing, in 
Chapter 7, that corrective justice is incompatible with strict liability). 
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wrongly imprisoned should have their compensation fixed to their 
preincarceration earnings potential. 
There is a further difficulty. Even if we can identify a wrong that ought 
to be remedied with reparative compensation, this approach cannot justify 
the fixed compensation schemes offered by compensation statutes—the 
gold-standard mode of relief for exonerees. Corrective justice’s reparative 
ideal inherently demands that assessments be individualized. Negligently 
bumping into you might not cause any injury whatsoever. But negligently 
bumping into a highly fragile person might lead to some catastrophic 
consequences, for which you might be on the hook, at least pursuant to the 
eggshell skull rule.21 Yet compensation statutes, at their core anyway, 
provide no individualized treatment of victims. (You will recall, for 
example, that North Carolina provides $50,000 per year of incarceration, 
with a $750,000 total cap, no matter your prior earnings potential or any 
“eggshell skull” you might have.) Corrective justice therefore does not do a 
very good job of justifying the way that compensation statutes actually 
compensate. We would have to understand these lock-step payouts as, at 
best, very rough proxies for harms to individual exonerees, which may be 
wildly over- or under-compensatory as measured by reference to actual 
harms needing remediation. 
This is not to say that corrective justice’s reparative ideal lacks merit. 
Innocent people who are incarcerated face numerous medical obstacles upon 
release, including psychological and physical trauma. Here the reparative 
ideal seems most apt and forceful. Compensation should include 
compensation for this kind of medical care, aimed at restoring bodily and 
mental integrity to the extent possible.22 Indeed, some states include this 
kind of relief in their compensation statutes.23 Other states provide 
educational grants or tuition reimbursements, presumably (though not 
necessarily) on the assumption that the exoneree would have obtained an 
education but for his incarceration.24 These are all good and important 
things. And nothing in this paper should be taken as an argument against 
providing reparative relief. Instead, I want to argue that even more is owed 
 
 21. See, e.g., Vosburg v. Putney, 50 N.W. 403 (Wis. 1891). 
 22. See Bernhard, supra note 3, at 404 (“Ideally, compensation statutes should provide 
generous, rapid, and certain damage awards, accompanied by education and social services, 
for all those who have been wrongly convicted and later exonerated.”) (emphasis added). 
 23. E.g., TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 103.001(d) (West, Westlaw through 
end of the 2015 Reg. Sess. of the 84th Leg.) (“[An exoneree] entitled to compensation . . . is 
also eligible to obtain group health benefit plan coverage through the Texas Department of 
Criminal Justice as if the person were an employee of the department.”). 
 24. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-84(c) (2015) (providing for job skills training and 
payment for, inter alia, tuition and fees). 
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at a minimum to exonerees as a matter of restitutionary justice, and that this 
restitution-based approach best justifies and explains compensation 
statutes.25 I turn to that issue in the Section that immediately follows. 
IV 
Corrective justice focuses exclusively, and hence problematically, on 
compensating victims for their wrongfully suffered injuries. The injuries 
suffered by exonerees are often quite salient, so it is not surprising that 
commentators tend to focus on reparative relief rather than other kinds.26 
Given these problems, I think that we should focus on a restitutionary 
model for exoneree compensation. In general, restitution looks at what one 
party has unjustly gained and seeks to undo that transaction by removing 
that which has been gained and returning it to the victim.27 So what does the 
government unjustly retain by incarcerating an innocent person, albeit 
 
 25. It has been suggested that we should turn to constitutional law for a better analogy. 
The Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution allows the government to take people’s property 
provided that the state uses that property for the public and gives “just compensation” for the 
appropriation—usually fair market value. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. In other words, from the 
Constitution’s point of view, taking a person’s property for public purposes may be all-things-
considered justified. Still, a wrong has been committed if the state fails to voluntarily offer up 
just compensation. Some have suggested that a wrongful conviction and imprisonment should 
be analogized to or understood as a taking under the Fifth Amendment. See, e.g., John 
Martinez, Wrongful Convictions as Rightful Takings: Protecting “Liberty-Property”, 59 
HASTINGS L.J. 515 (2008); Howard S. Master, Note, Revisiting the Takings-Based Argument 
for Compensating the Wrongfully Convicted, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 97 (2004); Ilya 
Somin, The Case for Compensating People Who Serve Time in Prison for Crimes They Did 
Not Commit, WASH. POST (Jan. 29, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2014/01/29/the-case-for-compensating-people-who-serve-time-in-prison-for-
crimes-they-did-not-commit/ [https://perma.cc/EY57-Q8M6]. Problematically, this analogy 
leads us astray, suggesting (in accordance with Takings Clause doctrine) that the proper 
measure of “just compensation” is reparative rather than restitutionary relief. See, e.g., Master, 
supra, at 143 (“The Supreme Court recently affirmed that the measure of damages under the 
federal Takings Clause is harm to the individual rather than use to the government, definitively 
rejecting the principle that the government must obtain a benefit in order for its compensation 
obligation to be invoked.”) (emphasis added). This is problematic for reasons already given in 
Section III. But my goal is not merely to highlight legal doctrines that seem to serve purposes 
similar to compensation statutes, but rather to identify deeper principles of justice that would 
justify and explain those statutes. The Takings Clause, while a clever analogy in some 
respects, is inadequate until we identify the principles of justice underpinning it. 
 26. See sources cited supra note 25. 
 27. WARD FARNSWORTH, RESTITUTION: CIVIL LIABILITY FOR UNJUST ENRICHMENT 1 
(2014) (commenting that restitution involves “the rights that arise not when one person has 
caused an unjustifiable loss to another, but when the defendant has unjustifiably gained at the 
plaintiff’s expense.”). The talk of plaintiff and defendant here makes plain that the author 
discusses legal claims brought in private lawsuits. I intend to speak more generally in terms of 
principles of justice presupposed by such private rights of action. 
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unintentionally? The answer: money to pay fair compensation for criminal-
deterrence services. To elaborate, prisoners function as instruments of 
criminal deterrence and law enforcement: We incarcerate people in order to 
deter other criminal wrongdoings. Those who are guilty give up their right 
not to be used as criminal-deterrence devices in this way.28 
But the innocent do not. Principles of restitution therefore demand that 
we should, at a minimum, compensate exonerees for each year they have 
served in prison, since failing to do so allows the state to unjustly extract 
without payment an important public service from exonerees. They must be 
paid accordingly, for each year of the dangerous, 24/7 crime-deterrence job 
they are forced to perform. Exonerees are owed compensation just like any 
other person employed by the state to fulfill its criminal law enforcement 
responsibilities. 
The military draft provides an analogy. Though they involve 
conscripting people into military service without their consent, drafts might 
be morally legitimate. But it is plainly illegitimate to press people into 
military service without compensating them for their work. This would be 
transparently wrong, essentially slavery. If we want to make explicit a moral 
principle that explains why this is wrong, consider this midlevel principle: 
refusing to provide fair compensation to people for the morally permissible 
services that they provide at your direction is prima facie unjust.29 Call this a 
principle of fair labor. Something like this principle grounds the 
restitutionary principle preventing people from forcibly, even if justifiably, 
benefitting from another’s labor without fair compensation. This principle 
strikes me as correct. But we might want to go deeper, seeking to ground 
this principle in a more basic one, such as the Kantian principle that one 
ought never treat persons solely as a means to one’s own end. 
Whatever the deeper foundations the restitutionary principle of fair 
labor, recognizing that compensating exonerees can be grounded in 
restitution has obvious advantages. First, a restitutionary perspective 
answers the corrective justice argument, which pressed the idea that “good 
faith” incarcerations were not compensable. Not so. Justice might require 
one to disgorge one’s unjust gains, even if one is wholly innocent. We 
needn’t engage in any debates about whether strict liability wrongs are truly 
wrongs in the sense needed to trigger a duty of repair pursuant to corrective 
justice. Accordingly, any jurisdiction that fails to provide near-immediate 
 
 28. See VICTOR TADROS, THE ENDS OF HARM: THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE 
CRIMINAL LAW 265–92, 312–30 (2011). 
 29. This might seem to imply that volunteer services are unjust. In response, we might 
characterize volunteers as those who voluntary waive their right to compensation. I thank 
Steve Bero for the objection and suggested response thereto. 
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compensation for its exonerees or requires them to prove that they have been 
incarcerated as a result of misconduct perpetuates serious injustice from the 
perspective of restitution. 
Restitution also gives guidance in answering the question of how much 
to compensate. For example, if we were to assume that exonerees were owed 
a federal minimum wage, supplemented by federal time-and-a-half overtime 
requirements, exonerees would be owed roughly $87,500 per year of 
incarceration. This figure assumes that innocent prisoners are paid minimum 
wage for twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, and fifty-two weeks a 
year. Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, qualified employees are entitled 
to 1.5 times the hourly salary for each hour worked over forty hours in a 
given week.30 Anything below that figure would be presumptively unfair on 
this approach. 
Another approach would try to link fair restitution to wages paid to 
workers performing labor analogous to full-time incarceration. Because 
innocent prisoners are essentially instruments of law enforcement, used for 
the purposes of deterring crime under dangerous and stressful prison 
conditions, perhaps exonerees must be paid on par with any other around-
the-clock law enforcement official performing dangerous and taxing work. 
Undercover police officers provide one analogy. Why undercover officers? 
The thought, roughly, is that certain deep-cover police officers must, at 
times, operate in the field gathering evidence around the clock, in sometimes 
highly risky conditions, with the ultimate goal of criminal law enforcement. 
Incarceration shares this around-the-clock risk of danger. Conscripts into the 
armed forces provide another analogy of a potentially dangerous security 
job. Indeed, the conscript analogy might be stronger in some ways given 
that, like exonerees, conscripts are sometimes pressed into service 
involuntarily. 
These analogies point us towards a principled approach to the how-
much-to-compensate question: Compensation afforded to exonerees qua 
instruments of law enforcement, operating in dangerous environments, 
arguably should be on par with the salary and benefits paid to undercover 
police officers or military conscripts. Some jurisdictions pay undercover 
officers in excess of $100,000 per year.31 Under the conscript analogy, 
exonerees would obtain compensation comparable to military personnel, and 
in particular, personnel with particularly hazardous job descriptions. But 
military compensation and benefits vary depending on years of service, 
 
 30. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (2012). 
 31. Dana Severson, How Much Does an Undercover Cop Make?, HOUSTON 
CHRONICLE, http://work.chron.com/much-undercover-cop-make-15934.html 
[https://perma.cc/E23M-6KL4]. 
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special allowances, and rank, so calculating the amount owed to exonerees 
might be a bit more complicated.32 
These analogies are rough. For one thing, they assume that the rates paid 
to undercover officers and soldiers are just. But at least these analogies point 
toward a principled way to answer the question of how much to compensate 
exonerees in recognition of services that they have provided. Exonerees have 
been conscripted without their consent in the war against crime, as 
instruments of criminal law enforcement. They should be paid accordingly. 
One last point. Whichever analogy is most apt—minimum-wage 
worker, undercover officer, conscript, or someone else—it is worth noting 
that the restitutionary approach, if correct, suggests that payout caps like the 
one imposed on McCollum and Brown in North Carolina are seriously 
unjust. The reason is simple. One may not, consistent with restitutionary 
justice, simply continue to withhold part of the money that one has unjustly 
withheld. One must disgorge all of it. Notice, by contrast, that corrective 
justice might rationalize compensatory caps found in some compensation 
statutes. Recall that these statutes provide lump-sum payouts based on a 
lock-step annual rate of compensation. Also recall that these payouts might 
be over- or under-compensatory with respect to the actual harms suffered as 
a result of incarceration, depending entirely on the harms suffered by the 
exoneree. One person might receive a windfall as a result of the 
compensation, and another might not obtain enough, depending (again) on 
the severity of the injuries suffered and the opportunities lost as a result of 
incarceration. But a cap might be easier to justify in light of a corrective-
justice-based justification of compensation statutes. After all, trying to avoid 
the recovery of windfalls by exonerees seems a legitimate goal; 
compensatory caps might simply be blunt tools for realizing this goal. So to 
the extent that compensation caps appear intuitively mistaken or even unjust, 
 
 32. As of January 2016, enlisted members of the armed forces on active duty earn, at 
the lowest-earning E-1 pay grade, $1,449.00 per month for the first three months and 
$1,566.90 per month for four months or more served, equaling $18,359.10 for the first year. 
DEF. FIN. & ACCOUNTING SERV., DEP’T OF DEF., BASIC PAY—EFFECTIVE JANUARY 1, 
2016, http://www.dfas.mil/dam/jcr:81e6bd2c-a106-461b-851d-
c77c7066baa5/2016MilitaryPayChart.pdf [https://perma.cc/E6H4-HRLD]. 
Importantly, military basic pay increases depending on years of service and rank, and does not 
include other benefits and allowances. For example, the military also awards $225 per month 
for hostile fire/imminent danger pay. Hostile Fire/Imminent Danger Pay, DEFENSE FINANCE 
AND ACCOUNTING SERVICE (Feb. 2, 2012), 
http://www.dfas.mil/militarymembers/payentitlements/specialpay/hfp_idp.html 
[https://perma.cc/4G2S-7Y7S]. Adding this amount would make the analogy with prison more 
apt, assuming prison also involves imminent danger. Adding this hostile fire/imminent danger 
pay to the lowest annual pay grade would bring the total pay of an E-1 grade enlisted soldier to 
$21,059.10 for that soldier’s first year of service. 
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the restitutionary approach provides a tidy explanation for this thought—at 
least as compared to any attempt to ground compensation statutes in 
corrective justice. 
V 
Now consider some objections. The first is a worry about perverse 
incentives. Suppose that the range of annual exoneree compensation is in the 
ballpark of $100,000. Suppose further that no caps on compensation are 
permissible. One objection is that officials will be even less disposed to 
admit mistakes regarding incarceration and will be even more inclined to 
resist attempts to exonerate prisoners. So advocating a fairly high amount of 
money as the proper range of compensation might have unintended 
consequences that are counterproductive from the perspective of justice.33 
Notice, first, that this objection does not deny that justice requires 
compensation on par with the amount advocated by this paper. Instead, the 
objection reflects a ubiquitous worry: pursuing justice always risks causing a 
backlash or creating counterproductive incentives. But this kind of worry 
can also be taken too far. Indeed, on the reasoning that the objection 
proposes, perhaps we should reduce the payout to zero to reduce the 
incentives for official obstinance. But this seems even more perverse. In 
addition, unintended consequences also potentially arise from inadequate 
compensation. Preliminary empirical work suggests that insufficient 
compensation, below a certain threshold, correlates with recidivism.34 This 
too must be considered. So given that it is difficult to predict in advance how 
unscrupulous or overzealous officials will react to the demands of justice, 
and given that undercompensating also carries risks of inducing recidivism, 
it seems better to pursue justice’s demands than accept status quo injustices. 
Another objection goes to the heart of this paper’s claim by denying that 
prisoners provide, in any intelligible sense, crime-deterrence “services.”35 
For each individual prisoner, one might argue, it is highly unlikely that he or 
she deters others from committing a crime, and indeed, once we take into 
 
 33. A version of this worry is expressed in Will Baude, The Unintended Consequences 
of Compensating the Exonerated, WASH. POST: THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 30, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/01/30/the-unintended-
consequences-of-compensating-the-exonerated/ [https://perma.cc/J56A-8GQQ] (“The bigger 
the compensation that the state has to pay, however, the more reluctant agents of the state 
might be to cooperate in an exoneration.”). 
 34. Mandery et al., supra note 5, at 583 (“[I]t is clear that substantial compensation [in 
excess of $500,000] may considerably reduce post-release offending.”). 
 35. Thanks to Alex Sarch for raising this concern. 
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account recidivism, incarceration may actually increase crime rates.36 And 
for all we know the likelihood that an innocent prisoner will succeed in 
deterring crime is even less likely. We should therefore conclude that 
prisoners perform no crime-deterrence services and, in turn, that 
restitutionary justice entitles them to no “back pay” for their services. 
But this objection rests on a mistake. Distinguish between the services 
rendered and the effects of those services. An incompetent police officer or 
soldier may, on an individual level, fail to deter any criminals or protect 
anyone from enemy combatants. Indeed, they may be so incompetent that 
they do more harm than good. But they are still entitled to compensation for 
the tasks that they performed, or in the case of the conscript, that they are 
required to perform even against their will. That is, they are entitled to 
compensation for the services that they have rendered to the institutions that 
they serve or are forced to serve. Those institutions—the police force or the 
military—ideally have crime-deterrent or war-deterrent effects. But 
compensation, under something like the aforementioned fair labor principle, 
is not contingent on whether either those institutions or the particular 
individuals actually succeed in bringing about the desired effects. 
One last objection.37 This paper has asserted without argument that 
deterrence is one of the systemic goals of the criminal justice system. And 
this indeed is one of the official, stated goals in many jurisdictions in the 
United States.38 But one of the dominant approaches to justifying criminal 
law in the philosophical literature—retributivism—insists that the sole goal 
of the criminal justice system is to punish the guilty, and that deterrence 
does not matter or matters much less.39 So it might be objected that, if this 
view is correct, then inmates whether innocent or not are not being used as 
instruments of the state for crime deterrence since that simply ought not be 
the goal of the criminal justice system. Still, intuitively the innocent ought to 
be compensated anyway. 
A full response cannot be offered here, at least not without wading into 
the well-developed scholarly literature on the question of whether 
retributivism suffices to justify criminal punishment. For what it is worth, I 
am inclined to think that punishing the guilty, even if doing so is good in and 
of itself, cannot suffice to justify a system of criminal law unless it also 
 
 36. See Mark W. Lipsey & Francis T. Cullen, The Effectiveness of Correctional 
Rehabilitation: A Review of Systematic Reviews, 3 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 297, 301 (2007). 
 37. I thank Steve Bero for articulating this objection. 
 38. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B) (2012) (listing “deterrence to criminal conduct” as 
one of the factors to be considered in sentencing). 
 39. A state-of-the-art defense of retributivism can be found in MICHAEL S. MOORE, 
PLACING BLAME: A THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (2010). 
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tends to deter crime.40 But consider the following further responses. First, as 
already mentioned, jurisdictions already officially acknowledge that 
deterrence is a goal of punitive incarceration. So my argument goes through 
at least for these jurisdictions. Second, nothing in this paper denies that 
corrective justice still provides grounds for recovery (albeit weaker 
grounds). The paper just points out the advantages of justifying 
compensation statutes—the gold standard for compensating exonerees—on 
restitutionary grounds. So it is a mistake to conclude that if recovery on 
restitutionary grounds were not available, then justice requires no exoneree 
compensation. Corrective justice waits in the wings. Finally, and most 
importantly, the argument proposed in this paper can be refashioned in terms 
of this imagined punishment-only criminal justice system. Even if the sole 
justification for a given criminal justice system is to punish the guilty, then 
prisoners are still enlisted in the service of that goal. And although it might 
be justified to withhold compensation from guilty offenders for services 
rendered via incarceration, withholding compensation from the innocent 
remains unjust. 
VI 
Exonerees are owed compensation. This paper began by rejecting the 
claim that this compensation ought to depend on whether the exoneree can 
establish that official misconduct caused their wrongful incarceration. It was 
argued that, even to the extent that corrective justice governs exoneree 
compensation, this does not necessarily require establishing official 
misconduct. This is because strict liability and corrective justice are 
reconcilable, and incarcerating the innocent can be construed as a form of 
strict liability wrong. 
Given the controversial nature of this claim, this paper favors justifying 
exoneree compensation primarily in terms of restitution rather than 
corrective justice. It is even less controversial that restitution requires no 
showing of misconduct. And once we recognize that innocent inmates in 
prisons are performing unpaid crime-deterrence services, the natural and 
appropriate level of compensation comes quickly into view—the state 
should pay the fair wages that it is withholding from exonerees. As a 
ballpark estimate, $100,000 is a fair annual payout, which roughly matches 
the amount paid to undercover police officers. The range, however, might 
vary depending on one’s preferred analogy. A conscripted soldier during 
wartime might earn less. But in any event the range of fair annual 
 
 40. Arguments against retributivism can be found, inter alia, in TADROS, supra note 28, 
at 44–87. 
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compensation will be relatively determinate, at least as compared to the 
compensatory disarray found among jurisdictions today. 
 
